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Introduction
This research aims at a new approach of detecting Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) web attacks. Using information from multiple stages instead of one, the evolution of XSS can be better captured. Moreover, a dual model is employed that integrates an XSS model and a normal traffic model, presenting two opposite perspectives of one web transaction. In practice, this approach can be supported by a honeypot for evidence generation and collection.
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attack
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attackers take advantages of improper input validation to inject malicious code into web pages. XSS attacks can lead to defacing web pages and leaking sensitive data [1] . For its seriousness and prevalence, OWASP has listed the XSS vulnerability in its Top 10 Most Critical Web Application Security Risks from 2013 to 2017 [2] .
There are three types of XSS attacks, i.e., stored, reflected, and DOM-based. In the stored XSS attack, it embeds a piece of malicious code into a vulnerable web page, which is stored on the web server for later use. As a result, the attack will be executed when a victim visits the vulnerable web page. In this case an attacker does not need to craft special URLs since the malicious payload is already on the web server. In a reflected XSS attack, the attacker tricks the victim into clicking on an ill-formed URL, which sends malicious code to a vulnerable web application on a server. If not properly handled, the response from the server is then directed back to the victim's browser that executes the XSS payload to enable the attacker to access the victim's data. In the DOM-based XSS, the attacker also tricks the victim into clicking on a maliciously crafted URL. But the malicious code will not be sent to the vulnerable application. Instead, it will be executed at some point when a web page is loaded onto the victim's machine. Our study focuses on reflective and stored XSS attacks.
Word2vec technique
Traditionally, a malicious script is inserted within a Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) code piece, which can be analyzed through natural language processing (NLP). It includes tag labels like <script>, <img> or <body> that can be considered as subjects, then follows with verb or noun, something like 'alert()' or 'onload=' in HTML. This mapping can be applied to all the elements in the HTML code.
There may be hidden relationships between tags or elements. Treating words in a piece of text as discrete atomic symbols in most of NLP systems seems not appropriate. More precisely, these words are arbitrarily encoded as integer values using a hash table. However, such encodings may fail to truly represent the words, as some important information, i.e., the linkage between tag and elements, is missing in coding. In contrast, representing such rich, high-dimensional relations as vectors, called word embeddings, can overcome the above problem. There is one of the most popular techniques used in NLP systems, called Word2vec. It is a predictive model used for learning the word embeddings from a text corpus, which is a list of words or tokens [3] . It comes with two model structures, the Continuous Bag-of-Words model (CBOW) and the Skip-Gram model. In our work, we utilize the CBOW model based on the following observations. 1) CBOW model focuses on the existence of a word in a window of surrounding words, but the Skip-Gram also values the order of words. However, CBOW model is good enough in our problem since switching two words likely does not make a big impact.
2) Compared to Skip-Gram model, CBOW model is more time-efficient.
After grouping similar words together in the vector space and assigning each word its corresponding vector value, Word2vec can "understand" the meaning of a piece of text, e.g., a web request or response, by establishing the association of any word pair. And the relationship of each word pair is measured by its cosine similarity in vector space.
Gaussian mixture model (GMM)
For statistical learning, [15] suggests that using GMM to fit the dataset and identify any outliers may be an alternative option if the Gaussian distribution is not applicable for the data. And as [16] states that GMM can well define all the possible data points by assigning the probability rather than a cluster in the k-means algorithm. Therefore, GMM can also be viewed as an extension to the k-means method, which is found to be the most popular statistical learning algorithm that finds probabilistic cluster assignments.
Last but not least, a mixture model is a probabilistic model that is used to solve the subpopulation assignment. For example, given the height data of a group of people (population) that includes an unknown number of female or male in the group (subpopulation), the mixture model assumes that such data act as the sum of two shifted and scaled normal distributions. It can learn the subpopulations and predict which subpopulation an unknown identity, i.e., an observation, belongs to using a probability score. If the prediction is achieved without labeling the datasets, similar to clustering, a mixture model is refereed as unsupervised learning model. One such a model is a Gaussian mixture model (GMM), which can have more than two components or subpopulations.
As illustrated in [4] , XSS attacks, as one population, are multimodal with more than one variant of attack payloads in terms of words being using in them. In one subpopulation, the word distribution of attacks may follow a normal distribution. If using only one distribution in modeling, the overall population may be poorly represented. It is important to model a multimodal distribution using a GMM model of multiple components.
In this work, we develop an approach that uses GMMs to analyze XSS and normal web transactions by examining their payload as evidences. This study aims to improve detection performance by two enhancements: (1) correlating evidences from multiple request and response stages of an attack instance, common in any client/server transactions, and (2) integrating two GMMs modeling XSS and normal respectively.
Related work
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) web attacks have been studied from different perspectives, including browser filter [11] , intrusion detection system [12] , [13] or firewall. Generally, they can be detected through signature-based, anomaly detection, or a combination of these two [14, 16] . Anomaly detection can handle zeroday attacks while signature-based methods may not; however, anomaly detection may perform poorly with a non-comprehensive normal profile.
Multi-stage attack detection
Several studies have employed machine learning algorithms to detect computer attacks while considering different attack stages. Katipally et al [5] analyzed attacker's behavior by utilizing a hidden Markov model (HMM). Their analysis considered a continuous sequence of different activities as one attack. In particular, they conceptualized five stages in such an attack model, where each stage represents a different operation. These stages include scanning through network mapping, enumeration through DNS requests, exploitation by access attempt through buffer overflow and SQL injection, exploitation by denial of service through flooding the system, and exploitation by malware through shell code. They generated input to train the HMM model based on previously learned alerts and intrusions that is effective in predicting the attacker's behavior. However, a typical problem associated with most machine learning methods is a tendency of generating false alarms.
Lee et al [6] also used HMM in intrusion detection using audit data. Their definition of a multi-stage attack consists of multiple attack activities, where each stage represents one type of attack. Installing an IDS agent based on Snort, they collected intrusion traces from each Page 7167 attack stage and fed the information to the HMM model. Their system showed efficiency in detection, but with a relatively high false positive rate.
Sampath et al [7] took one step further in using the HMM and bag of words model by including the context in analysis. The contextual information they included varies from the source and destination IP addresses to the alert type and category. The intrusion alerts were first categorized according to K-means clustering. Then they fed collected sequences of alerts labeled with the cluster information to an HMM model that can predict the next probable alerts. The prediction can provide information about future attack strategies. Similarly, they considered one complete sequence of a multi-stage intrusion, which also consists of multiple attack activities. Their proposed system was sensitive to the number of clusters chosen in K-means clustering. It can produce an accuracy of 88% using 5 clusters while the accuracy drops to 31% using 50 clusters.
Almutairi et al [8] proposed a method to detect multi-stage attacks based on examining the reputation of network IP addresses using fuzzy logic. They captured network traffic in three multi-stage attack scenarios. They evaluated the reputation of the IP address using fuzzy rules. The four fuzzy rules were formulated based on blocked IPs, anonymous proxy IPs, malicious geographical IPs, and low rated IPs. Their approach was efficient with a zero false positive rate for IP addresses classified as malicious. However, relying on whitelisting, it failed to detect new malicious IPs.
XSS attack detection
XSS attack detection based on machine learning has been well studied by researchers in these years. Fang et al presented a novel signature-based detection system using Word2vec and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) models [17] . After extracting the features by Word2vec, a LSTM model can be trained to segregate the XSS from normal data. And the precision rate is 99.5% in real dataset.
Liu addressed web attack detection and employed several machine learning algorithms [9] . The author utilized Gaussian HMM and a lexical segmentation technique based on the bag of words technique. Both training and testing the HMM model used payloads in web requests, i.e., a URL link, to classify the traffic as normal or XSS. It claimed to achieve an accuracy of over 90% in detection.
Wang et al [10] utilized an HMM model combined with the Bayes theorem. The authors stated that this method can learn the structure of attack vectors and minimize flaws of traditional sanitization procedures. The authors tried to evaluate the performance of such learning model using mutated XSS attacks in the XSSed database (http://xssed.com). Such XSS attacks may not include realistic attack variants. Moreover, design of this HMM model as well as how data collection was done lacked specific details.
In contrast to many server-side XSS detection systems, Pelizzi et al [11] presented a new client-side XSS filter called XSSFilt. It was claimed to outperform NoScript, a Firefox plug-in, XSS Auditor on Google Chrome, and other server-side solutions in detecting reflected XSS attacks. The key functions of this filter include use of approximation rather than exact string match, utilization of their own improved syntactic confinement policy that are not SQL specific, and analysis on web responses. However, its approximate substring matching can lead to overfitting that increases the false positive rate. It may fail to identify unseen and varied XSS instances.
In summary, most of studies that employ a machine learning approach in XSS detection, being either signature-based or anomaly-based, by use the evidence in only either the web request or the response. Consequently, these detection systems may fail to identify malicious script if such evidences alone are not discriminating enough. We propose an innovative approach utilizing dual GMM models to better characterize the difference between XSS and normal web transactions to fill this gap.
Our approach
We try to correlate evidences in both request and response payloads of an XSS attack. With richer information, it is believed that number of false positives and negatives can be potentially reduced. Practically, we utilize separate GMM models to characterize XSS and normal web transactions respectively and integrate predictions from these models in order to provide better classification of a new web transaction. Table 1 shows how our work (in shade) is compared to other existing efforts of XSS modeling and detection. The payloads of a complete request/response chain are assembled together to represent an entire web useful on this front as in [19] and [20] . We can continue to investigate this approach by studying better data collection and feature extraction techniques.
Conclusion
Most of the existing solutions of detecting XSS attacks examine the evidence in only one stage. We have studied an approach that looks at the information in both request and response stages and employs a dual model of combining anomaly detection with misuse detection. This approach utilizes the Word2vec technique and Gaussian mixture models. Evaluation using real data coming from two databases of XSS and normal web transactions has shown its effectiveness.
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